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The End
• Government and Corporate Entities have Processes 
for Defining, Understanding, and Resourcing 
Programs and Projects
• These Processes, or Systems, Generally Provide 
Adequate Resources to Accomplish the 
Requirements
• DoD and NASA have Instituted Policies and 
Practices to Identify and Prevent Extreme Cost 
Growth
• A Primary Cause of Extreme Cost Growth is a Failure 
in the System
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Nunn-McCurdy
• In order to combat cost growth Senator Nunn and 
Representative McCurdy established legislation in the 
early 1980s requiring programs to report on significant 
cost growth
• A significant breach is 15% growth above the current 
baseline, or 30% above the original baseline
• A critical breach is 25% growth above the current 
baseline, or 50% above the original baseline
• Critical breaches can result in program cancellation 
unless the program is restructured and root-cause 
analysis is conducted on the program’s cost growth
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NASA Policy
• Rebaselined if cost exceeds 30% of Agency Baseline 
Commitment (ABC) – must report to OMB if growth exceeds 10%
• Joint Cost Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) analysis used to 
establish ABC
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Extreme Cost Growth
• For DoD Programs, Extreme Cost Growth is Well Defined (Nunn-
McCurdy)
• For NASA Programs and Projects, the Definition of Extreme Cost 
Growth is Less Well Defined
• Tolerance of Cost Growth Appears to be Related to the Importance 
of the Program or Project to the Organization and the Politicians
– Kept: F-35 JSF, JWST, Orion
– Killed: Ares I, Future Combat Systems
• For the Purposes of this Study, Extreme Cost Growth is Exceeding 
the Baseline Estimate by 100% or more
– Baseline for Study Data is System Requirements Review (SRR)
• No Correlation between Estimate and % Cost Growth or Actual 
Cost and % Cost Growth
• High Correlation between Estimate and Amount of Cost Growth, 
Actual Cost and Amount of Cost Growth 6
History for Cost Estimators
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17 Projects Below Cost
18 Projects > 100% Cost Growth
Mean: 56.2%
Median: 35.1%
# of Projects: 132
Standard Deviation: 82.5%
Minimum: -26.8%
Maximum: 498.3%
History has a Fat Tail
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Long Fat Tail
Lognormal-Pareto Splice Predicted Frequency
A Simplistic Approach
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Use Cost Growth PDF to 
Develop Realistic Cost Risk 
Analyses (CV, Risk of 
Extreme Cost Growth, etc.)
Add 50% to any Estimate 
to Account for Expected 
Cost Growth
Two Views of the World
Cost Estimator/Analyst
• Data Driven
• Judgement and Experience
• Comfortable with Uncertainty
• Weighs all the Evidence
• Focused on Credibility, 
Supportability, Defendability
Project Manager
• Results Driven (Job to do)
• Sees the World Deterministically
• Consistent Message
• Builds/Maintains Relationships
• Focused on Success
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Natural
Tension
History for Managers
• Top Four: Inadequate Project Definition; Optimistic Cost Estimates; 
Unexecutable Schedule; Inadequate Risk Assessments
• Number of reasons increasing over time (failure to learn?)
• Specific, Explainable, Actionable
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Cost Growth Reasons 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Inadequate definitions prior to agency budget decision and to external commitments X X X X
Optimistic Cost Estimates/Estimating Errors X X X X
Inability to execute initial schedule baseline X X X X
Inadequate risk assessments X X X X
Higher technical complexity of projects than anticipated X X X X
Changes in Scope (Design/Content) X X X X
Inadequate assessment of impacts of schedule changes on cost X X X
Annual Funding instability X X
Eroding in-house technical expertise X X
Poor tracking of contractor requirements against plans X X
Launch Vehicle X
Reserve Position adequacy X X
Lack of Probabilistic estimating X X
"Go as you can afford" Approach X
Lack of formal document for recording key technical, schedule and programmatic 
assumptions (CARD)** X
** CADRe has since been implemented as a requirement of NPR 7120.5
The Illusion of History
• Begin with a flawed understanding of cause and effect
• Use heuristics that are intuitive, simple, and easily 
understandable
• Minimize the impact of randomness or chance
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The illusion that one has understood the past 
feeds the further illusion that one can predict and 
control the future.  These illusions are comforting.  
They reduce the anxiety we would experience if we 
allowed ourselves to fully acknowledge the 
uncertainties of existence.
Daniel Kahneman, “Thinking, Fast and Slow”
Over-specification
• Our overly simplistic understanding of the past 
creates the illusion that the future is deterministic
– A flawed understanding of cause and effect
• We focus on the desired result, then back into the 
specific conditions needed to get us there
– “The cost is too high, your heritage assumption is too low.”
• Providing more specificity to the initial conditions 
leads to the belief that we are reducing uncertainty
– Creates a false confidence in the estimate
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We confuse our ability to define the present 
with the ability to predict the future.
Random Stuff Happens
• High technology projects are complex and fragile – small 
things can have large negative consequences
• We cannot foresee, with any reasonable reliability, what will 
cause cost growth or how extreme that growth will be
• 14% probability of extreme cost growth per history, yet most 
cost risk analyses assume lower probability
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Complex systems are full of interdependencies – hard to 
detect – and nonlinear responses. … Man-made complex 
systems tend to develop cascades and runaway chains of 
reactions that decrease, even eliminate, predictability and 
cause outsized events.
Nassim Taleb, “Antifragile”
Case Study: HST
• Complex Management Interface
– Two Primes: Lockheed & Perkin-Elmer
– Two NASA Centers: MSFC (Spacecraft, Telescope, Integration); GSFC 
(Science Instruments, Ground System)
• Assumed Use of Existing/Standard Hardware did not Materialize
• Original Estimate did not Include Sufficient Spares
• Large Weight Margin led to Assumed Cost Savings – Weight Growth 
Consumed Margin and Design had to be Light Weighted
• Telescope was Sold as Design-to-Cost with Performance as the 
Variable – However Performance was held Constant
• Telescope Contamination Requirements Increased
• Historical Data indicating High Cost for Optics, Fine Guidance 
Sensors, and Optical Structures Removed from CERs
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Cost Growth: 274% in Constant Year Dollars
Did we Learn from HST?
A History of Large Space Telescope Cost Estimates and Actuals
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Why the System Breaks
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• The management system designed to prevent 
programmatic failure breaks when independent cost 
analysis is not included in the decision process
– No healthy tension between the project management and 
programmatic analysis community
– No consideration of alternative points of view
– Often goes hand-in-hand with a lack of independent 
technical analysis
– Selling the project is more important that knowing the truth
• Failure to perform an independent cost analysis 
does not guaranty that the project will fail to 
perform, but it does increase the likelihood
Observations from DoD
• Learned Helplessness
– While a program manager is responsible for the success of a program, 
he or she is not the ultimate authority
– Program managers often have to endure changes imposed upon them 
by their bosses, as well as Congress
– This loss of control is a psychic stress that results in a sense of learned 
helplessness that can cause a program manager to lose their sense of 
responsibility
– Results in a denigration of program performance
• Program Management Durability
– DoD program managers are often military officers
– These officers are on a continual rotation cycle that takes place every 
few years
– These program managers thus do not have to “eat their own dinner” –
thus they have no skin in the game
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JCL: A NASA Success Story?
• Data from CADRe and the ONCE Database
• Average cost growth from SRR to Actuals not statistically 
different from large data set (Chart 7)
• Lack of overall cost growth from ABC to Actuals indicates that 
JCL might be working (more data needed to confirm) 19
Mission SRR ABC Actuals SRR to ABC SRR to Actuals ABC to Actuals
NuSTAR $96.2 $109.9 $104.0 14.2% 8.1% -5.4%
Landsat 8 $382.1 $587.6 $395.7 53.8% 3.6% -32.7%
IRIS $86.2 $140.7 $156.0 63.3% 81.1% 10.9%
LADEE $117.9 $168.2 $188.3 42.6% 59.6% 11.9%
MAVEN $488.7 $567.2 $467.9 16.1% -4.2% -17.5%
GPM $660.2 $555.2 $470.5 -15.9% -28.7% -15.3%
OCO-2 $225.2 $249.0 $304.6 10.6% 35.3% 22.3%
SMAP $412.0 $485.7 $469.9 17.9% 14.0% -3.2%
MMS $741.0 $857.3 $962.3 15.7% 29.9% 12.2%
Astro-H $30.0 $44.9 $51.0 49.9% 70.1% 13.5%
OSIRIS-Rex $515.7 $778.6 $648.7 51.0% 25.8% -16.7%
CYGNSS $125.0 $152.8 $90.1 22.2% -27.9% -41.0%
SAGE-III $56.8 $64.6 $81.6 13.7% 43.7% 26.3%
Average 27.3% 23.9% -2.7%
Cost GrowthData
A Predictive Model
• Can Extreme Cost Growth be Predicted Analytically?
– The hypothesis is that cost growth is often due to a misalignment of 
cost, schedule, and performance baselines early in the program
– If we could provide decision makers with a tool that could alert them to 
this fact, we could potentially avoid extreme cost growth
• Tool of Choice: Logistic Regression
• Logistic regression is a classification technique
– Algebraically, the logistic regression model has the form 
where g(x) = b0+ b1*x
– Logistic regression arose in epidemiological research, and is now 
commonly employed in business and finance, ecology, engineering, 
health policy, and linguistics
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Early Results
• Used the NASA cost growth 
study and version 5.0 of Joe 
Hamaker’s Quick Cost 
database (69 data points)
• Independent variables 
include:
– Initial cost
– Initial schedule
– Spacecraft complexity
– Instrument complexity
– Planetary vs. Earth-Orbiting
– Was the budget capped?
– Was it mostly design and built in-
house by the government?
• Results:
• There are 17 instances of 
extreme cost growth in the 
data set. The model predicts 
7 of these (misses 10)
• The model also predicts 11 
missions to have extreme 
cost growth that did not 
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Bottom Line: More Work to be Done.
General Observations
• A system that is larger and more complex than 
previous, similar systems should cost more than the 
predecessor systems
• The greater the number of cost saving assumptions 
the greater the likelihood of cost growth
• In general, technology advances will not reduce cost
• The more important the system is to the organization 
the more it will cost
• Being told up front what it will cost is a really, really 
bad sign
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Conclusions
• Extreme Cost Growth is primarily a failure in 
management that results from overselling and under 
controlling
• It is possibly easier to prevent Extreme Cost Growth 
than it is to foresee it due to randomness
• No independent cost estimates or analyses by an 
independent organization are a bad sign
• JCL combined with independent assessment might 
be a forcing function for good program planning and 
management
23
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